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The View from Down Under: 
Freedom of the Press in Canada 
James Allan 
In this paper I hope to take a look at the scope of press freedom in 
certain respects under Canada’s entrenched, constitutionalized Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms,1 and to do so through Australian eyes. 
Of course I myself am only a transplant to Down Under. If you could 
hear me you could tell immediately that my speaking voice sounds pretty 
much the way you would expect from someone who was born and raised 
in Toronto, went to university at Queen’s, married and worked as a 
lawyer on Bay Street and then moved to London, England to work at the 
Bar, then moved to Hong Kong for four years, then to New Zealand for 
eleven, and finally to Australia for the last eight years — always one step 
ahead of extradition as I like to say. 
And all those moves from Hong Kong onwards have been to take up 
jobs teaching public law in universities. So my accent notwithstanding, I 
have a lot more experience of constitutional law in the Antipodes than 
here and also of seeing Canadian constitutional law from an offshore 
vantage. 
My paper will try to give you a taste of that foreigner’s perspective 
by comparing the scope of freedom of the press in Canada, with its 
Charter, and in Australia where (almost uniquely in the democratic 
world) there is no national bill of rights of any sort. (And to lay my cards 
on the table I should tell you straight out that I dislike all types of bills of 
rights — on democratic grounds2 — a view shared by only a small 
category of legal academics in Canada.) 
                                                                                                             
 Garrick Professor of Law, University of Queensland. This paper was first delivered on 
March 9, 2012 at the Ryerson University “Press Freedom in Canada: A Status Report on the 30th 
Anniversary of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms” Conference in Toronto. It is made available 
with the permission of the organizers of that conference. The author thanks Jamie Cameron for her 
comments on an earlier version of this paper, as well as the participants in the above conference. 
1 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 
1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. 
2 See, e.g., James Allan, “Bills of Rights and Judicial Power – A Liberal’s Quandary?” 
(1996) 16 Oxford J. Legal Stud. 337; James Allan, Sympathy and Antipathy: Essays Legal and 
Philosophical (Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 2002); James Allan, “Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions 
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However, before I move on to the Canada-Australia comparison of 
the scope of press freedom, I need to do three things. First, I need to give 
you at least a basic account of why free speech and a free press matter. 
My answer falls squarely in the utilitarian John Stuart Mill tradition, 
which argues that in the long term the best consequences for any society 
flow from allowing the vigorous, untrammelled competition of ideas and 
views and speech, however hurtful or offensive or character-impugning 
they might be to some listeners and readers. 
If you want to put it in unqualified terms, here is how John Milton 
did so back in 1644: 
Let Truth and Falsehood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the 
worse, in a free and open encounter? (Areopagitica) 
Or if you prefer, here is how I would make the point, namely, that the 
sort of free speech that matters is the kind that offends, disturbs, unsettles 
and bothers people. A protection or guarantee of free speech where the 
topic is one everyone agrees about is worthless. It does not do anything. 
If we are all sitting in a circle, holding hands, with someone strumming 
on the guitar while we hum “Kumbaya” together then enforceable 
protections for free speech simply are not needed. You need protections 
for speech (and newspaper published speech) when the content is not 
something with which you already agree, when it offends you, when it 
challenges you, when you would rather not hear it at all. 
And the main reason I think this sort of speech needs protecting is 
the one — as I said — that John Stuart Mill gave.3 That the best alterna-
tives or social solutions — or perhaps sometimes the least bad ones — 
                                                                                                             
and Judges” in Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth, eds., Litigating Rights: Perspectives from 
Domestic and International Law (Oxford and Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, 2002) 29; James Allan, 
“Oh That I Were Made Judge in the Land” (2002) 30 Fed. L. Rev. 561; James Allan, “Paying for the 
Comfort of Dogma” (2003) 25 Sydney L. Rev. 63; James Allan, “A Modest Proposal” (2003) 23 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 197; James Allan, “An Unashamed Majoritarian” (2004) 27 Dal. L.J. 537; 
James Allan, “Portia, Bassanio or Dick the Butcher? Constraining Judges in the Twenty-First 
Century” (2006) 17 King’s College L.J. 1; James Allan, “Thin Beats Fat Yet Again – Conceptions of 
Democracy” (2006) 25 Law & Phil. 533; James Allen, “The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities: Exegesis and Criticism” (2006) 30 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 906; “Public Conversation 
on Constitutionalism and the Judiciary between Professor James Allan and the Honourable Michael 
Kirby” (2009) 33 Melbourne U.L. Rev. 1032; “Statutory Bills of Rights: You Read Words In, You 
Read Words Out, You Take Parliament’s Clear Intentions and You Shake Them All About – Doin’ 
the Sankey Hanky Panky” in T. Campbell, K. Ewing & A. Tomkins, eds., The Legal Protection of 
Human Rights: Sceptical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) 108; and The Vantage of 
Law: Its Role in Thinking about Law, Judging and Bills of Rights (Farnham, U.K.: Ashgate, 2011). 
3 As in J.S. Mill, On Liberty (first published in 1865). 
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will emerge from the cauldron of vigorous, heated debate, mockery and 
exchange of views. Most speech, most of the time, ought to be tolerated. 
A corollary of that is that all of us living in free, democratic societies 
have an obligation to grow thick skins, to toughen up. We do not get the 
misguided luxury of playing the victim, of stifling talk and words that we 
find hurtful. And we don’t get that luxury because every once in a while 
— no one knows for sure when — those hurtful words are making a 
powerful point — as they did, say, in the U.S. South in the 1950s and 
1960s. 
No one can expect good long-term consequences to flow when gov-
ernment and bureaucrats and overzealous human rights commissioners 
become the arbiters of what can and cannot be said.4 
So having plenty of scope for citizens in a democracy to speak their 
minds matters, and it matters however seemingly misguided, erroneous 
and distasteful their words might be. And notice that saying that is 
wholly consistent with accepting that no society will ever be able to 
make the entitlement of free speech an absolute right. Even in the U.S., 
where at least in formal legal terms there is more protection of speech 
than anywhere else on the planet, even there there is no protection for 
speech that counsels murder or details how to make some virulent 
biological weapon or much else besides. 
We are talking relativities here. We may trade scope to speak off 
against the clear need to stop counselling a likely murder, or even a 
knowingly false statement aimed at character assassination. But we want 
the line drawn with as much protection for speech as we can stomach 
when it comes to words we merely disagree with or find offensive. The 
long-term good consequences of this are simply too clear and too 
valuable. 
So that is why I think free speech matters. And, as everyone attend-
ing a symposium on freedom of the press already realizes, a free press 
lies at the very heart of any tolerably functioning social system protect-
ing free speech. Indeed, in practical terms a free press is the most 
important aspect of living in a society that affords lots of scope to free 
speech. 
That was my first preliminary point, setting out why free speech and 
a free press matter. 
                                                                                                             
4 Those comments should make it plain that I am a strong opponent of the Macleans/Mark 
Steyn type speech suppressing litigation which I elaborate upon below. 
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The second thing I need to do before embarking on a Canadian-
Australian free press comparison is to show you, briefly, just how 
constitutionally similar these two countries are in terms of history and 
political structure. Pick the country in the world most similar to Canada 
and it would be Australia. 
Why? Well, they are both products of the British Empire, with all the 
shared history that entails. In particular, that means that they share the 
common law, a Westminster parliamentary system of government, a 
myriad of shared political conventions, and the same head of state to this 
day. They are also both very, very large countries with federal (not 
unitary) systems, though when the Australian founding fathers came to 
choose what sort of federal system to have in the late 1890s they opted 
for the American model over the Canadian one.5 
Likewise, both Canada and Australia are bicameral (or two legisla-
tive chambers) systems, though again the Australian founding fathers 
shunned the Canadian/United Kingdom model of an unelected Upper 
House in favour of the American model of an elected Genuine Upper 
House of Review that looks palatable in the democratic era.6 
I suppose while mentioning differences I might add that Australia’s 
constitutional amending formula, section 128 of its Constitution that 
requires a national referendum (with a proposed amendment needing 50 
per cent plus one of voters nationally as well as in over half the states), 
was copied from Switzerland (with Canada’s and America’s “ask-the-
politicians-only” models being rejected) so as to introduce a dollop of 
direct democracy into attempts to amend the Constitution Down Under. 
And Australia operates a compulsory voting system, which I did not 
much like when I arrived Down Under but now have changed my mind 
about and think preferable.7 At the very least it avoids the now abysmal 
Canadian voter turnout figures while leaving political parties free to 
concentrate on their message rather than putting lots of resources into 
getting out the vote. 
Yet those differences notwithstanding, Australia is clearly and un-
doubtedly Canada’s closest cousin in overall constitutional terms. 
                                                                                                             
5 So the Australian drafters opted for a list of enumerated powers for the central govern-
ment alone, the residue going to the states, rather than the Canadian-style option of enumerating the 
powers of both the centre and the provinces. 
6 In Australia, as in the U.S., each state is given the same number of senators. In Australia 
it is currently 12 senators for each state, with only six contesting each election on a rolling basis. 
7 See James Allan, “In Praise of Compulsory Voting” (May 2012) 56 Quadrant 36. 
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That brings us to the last of my preliminary points, namely, a few 
words about the Charter. Now truth be told, and whatever well-founded 
patriotism might incline you to think, the Charter has not travelled 
particularly well. Canada’s model of a bill of rights was explicitly 
rejected by New Zealand in 1990 and by the United Kingdom in 1998. It 
was seen as too potent in terms of transferring power to unelected judges 
to draw debatable, disputed policy lines over a host of social issues about 
which smart, well-informed, nice people simply disagree.8 
Put more bluntly, the Charter was seen as just as counter-majoritarian 
as the U.S. Bill of Rights, notwithstanding the section 33 notwithstand-
ing clause, which most everyone by now realizes has never once been 
used at the federal level — not one single time in three decades. 
Whether one happens to agree with that democracy-enervating char-
acterization of the Charter or not (and I do), the fact remains it is not a 
much-copied model. If you find that claim too provocative then let us say 
that the power to strike down or invalidate legislation is not much copied 
in the Commonwealth. And when it comes to Australia the Charter and 
its judicial power-enhancing effects were regularly cited by opponents 
during recent attempts to adopt or enact some sort of bill of rights.9 
In fact, Australia’s history as regards attempts to achieve some sort 
of bill of rights is basically this: there have been two constitutional 
amendment referenda asking the voters if they want one, the most recent 
in 1988. Both lost badly, the 1988 one losing in every single state in 
Australia. And with any Canadian or U.S.-style constitutional bill of 
rights thereby off the table (and it would be a fun counter-factual to 
wonder if Pierre Trudeau could have got the Charter through if he had 
had to get the agreement of a majority of voters nationally and in a 
                                                                                                             
8 There is a school of thought that points to overseas citations of Canadian Charter deci-
sions to argue that it is, contrary to my views above, a much copied or mimicked instrument. I think 
that view is wrong for two main reasons. First, Canada’s two-stage Charter analyses — where most 
of the work is done in stage 2 when assessing s. 1 reasonableness — make it easier to make (and 
hence have cited elsewhere) expansive obiter rights comments than in the U.S., where all the work 
of deciding if a right applies and what limitation is reasonable is done in one stage. (See my review 
of Kent Roach’s The Supreme Court on Trial: Judicial Activism or Democratic Dialogue? (Toronto: 
Irwin, 2001), in “The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks” (2003) 20 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 519.) 
Second, there is in my view a clear ratchet-up effect when it comes to courts citing overseas rights 
decisions, and this is combined with a cherry-picking effect — the core point being that the overseas 
judgment is not driving the decision, it is window-dressing for a view reached on other grounds. This 
argument is made in James Allan, Grant Huscroft & Nessa Lynch, “The Citation of Overseas 
Authority in Rights Litigation in New Zealand: How Much Bark? How Much Bite?” (2007) 11 
Otago L. Rev. 433. 
9 See James Allan, “You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For: No Bill of Rights for 
Australia” (2010) 24 N.Z.U.L. Rev. 179. 
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majority of provinces, the Australian amending requirement), proponents 
shifted to arguing for a New Zealand-style statutory bill of rights, 
especially after 2007 and the election of a seemingly pro-bill of rights 
Labor government. But public opposition was too great to proceed even 
with that model.10 
A Canadian audience may well find the concept of opposing a bill of 
rights sufficiently unfathomable to want to ask why anyone would do 
such a thing, so let me highlight the main grievances. The core of the 
case against is that all rights in a bill of rights — and none more so than 
the right to free speech — embody vague, amorphous moral abstractions 
pitched at such a high level of indeterminacy that they effectively finesse 
all disagreement. Bills of rights are articulated up in the Olympian 
heights of moral abstractions (right to free speech, right to equality, and 
so on) where all is consensus and agreement, but they have real effect 
down in the quagmire of detail (where to draw the lines in a defamation 
regime or campaign finance system or setup that outlaws speech that is 
hateful, to stay only within the confines of a free speech entitlement). 
And down in that quagmire of social policy line-drawing details what 
you have is inevitable disagreement between people just as nice and as 
smart and as well-meaning as you, and yes, as some committee of ex-
lawyer judges.11 
So if you believe in democracy12 a bill of rights is highly problematic 
— unless you just suppose or assume that the 5-4 decision of a top court 
has some mystical correlation with what actually is the timeless, funda-
mental rights-respecting answer. In other words, it is problematic unless 
you assume that unelected ex-lawyer judges have superior moral anten-
nae to your average voter and that their judicial verdict on rights issues is 
better — morally better — than the electorate’s majority verdict. 
And of course there are further difficulties about not according 
people a right to participate in key public decisions (think same-sex 
marriage, think when tobacco companies can advertise, think every 
major Charter decision since 1982), this denied right to participate 
seemingly lying at the core of treating individuals as autonomous, 
                                                                                                             
10 Id. 
11 For those interested in my much more fully argued position, see the pieces cited supra, 
note 2. 
12 And I mean democracy in the procedural sense, not some morally pregnant sense where 
the moral goodness of a substantive outcome determines whether the jurisdiction counts as a 
democracy. See “Thin Beats Fat Yet Again – Conceptions of Democracy”, supra, note 2. 
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respect-deserving agents — a core pre-supposition of the modern human 
rights movement.13 
So there are all the variants of objections related to how judges 
garner too much power under these instruments, how they themselves 
decide rights issues on a procedural, count-heads, majority rules basis (five 
votes beat four, full stop), as well as the straight-out consequentialist 
objection to bills of rights that says that in a well-functioning democracy 
legislators (on average, over time) do at least as well as unelected judges 
in achieving rights-respecting outcomes — which happens to be my 
view. And such legislators have considerably more legitimacy to be 
making these decisions than judges — which procedural buttressing 
point is also my view as it happens. 
For the rest of this paper it is only that last consequentialist claim 
that will be my focus, the one arguing that elected legislators do at least 
as well as unelected judges in producing rights-respecting outcomes. And 
I will now confine myself to freedom of the press issues, or at least the 
subset of such issues that covers hate speech and defamation. 
My claim will be that Australia, without any sort of national bill of 
rights at all, has at least as much press freedom as does Canada with its 
Charter. 
Let me start with hate speech laws. Even a passing acquaintance with 
the Mark Steyn-Macleans saga with section 13 of the Canadian Human 
Rights Act14 (and various provincial equivalents) would suffice to show 
that hate speech laws can and do have an effect on the press, on what it 
might or might not be able to publish, and concomitantly on what can be 
thought of as the “chilling effect” of the mere threat of being dragged 
before some human rights commission where the complainant has every 
single dollar of his or her legal costs paid for by the taxpayer while the 
accused — the party alleged to have transgressed these hate speech 
provisions — has to pay his or her own way. 
Put more bluntly, even if you end up winning you lose. Steyn and 
Macleans eventually had every single legal action against them dropped 
or ended or dismissed and yet they were out of pocket very large sums 
                                                                                                             
13 This is the basis on which Jeremy Waldron argues against constitutionalized bills of 
rights. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999) 
and “The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review” (2006) 115 Yale L.J. 1346. My differently 
focused but largely sympathetic analyses of Waldron are in “Jeremy Waldron and the Philosopher’s 
Stone” (2008) 45 San Diego L. Rev. 133 and “The Travails of Justice Waldron” in Grant Huscroft, 
ed., Expounding the Constitution: Essays in Constitutional Theory (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2008) 161. 
14 R.S.C. 1985, c. H-6. 
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indeed. I had originally written that those costs were well into six figures 
but a friend and former lawyer colleague of mine on Bay Street laughed 
at me when he read that and said that I had been out of practice for too 
long. He told me that the cost to Macleans or its insurers probably hit 
seven figures. Since then I have had even better information that the 
costs to them were about $2.5 million. 
No one who cares about a free press can pretend that sort of outcome 
does not deter those who lack the deep pockets of Macleans. Or at any 
rate, if you can make that claim with a straight face then in my view you 
ought to move to Los Angeles and look for acting work. 
So let us look more closely at the state of hate speech laws in Can-
ada, assuming as I do that any such laws do affect the scope of a free 
press to publish things many would consider part of the give-and-take of 
life in a democratic polity. 
We can simplify things by separating criminal and non-criminal hate 
speech restrictions. Only the latter is likely to be relevant to a discussion 
of freedom of the press, though the leading Supreme Court of Canada 
cases, respectively, are R. v. Keegstra15 (in the criminal realm) and 
Canada (Human Rights Commission) v. Taylor16 (in the civil). 
In Taylor, a 5-4 majority decision, the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the section 13 regulation of what was considered hate 
speech, under which civil remedies are available aimed at compensating 
complainants and discouraging speakers outside the criminal law. In 
brief, the majority held that section 13 infringed the freedom of expres-
sion guarantee but that this infringement was justifiable under section 1 
of the Charter, the abridging provision. Chief Justice Dickson for the 
majority pointed to such factors as the reduced worth of hate speech, the 
fact the remedies were civil (not penal) in nature and the importance of 
the goal of protecting minorities in arguing that the section 13 free 
speech infringement was justified. Meanwhile then Justice McLachlin, in 
her dissent, disagreed, arguing that section 13 gave the Human Rights 
Commission too much discretion, that it had a “chilling effect”, and that 
the restriction was framed in overbroad terms. 
For our purposes one single and immediate point to make is that the 
Charter, or more accurately put “the interpretation of some vague, 
amorphous rights guarantee and equally indeterminate reasonable limits 
                                                                                                             
15 [1990] S.C.J. No. 129, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697 (S.C.C.). 
16 [1990] S.C.J. No. 131, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 892 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Taylor”]. 
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provision” by a majority of the then top Canadian judges, did nothing to 
extend freedom of the press. 
If you dislike section 13 the judges let you down. If you like section 
13 they ended up adding nothing to the equation. Or rather, they added 
nothing other than what follows from the assumption that the answers to 
all political disputes can be (and should be) found by vetting laws against 
constitutionalized rights provisions (as interpreted by a committee of ex-
lawyers), an assumption open to serious doubt.17 And one that makes it 
harder to repeal such legislation once the top judges, even on a 5-4 basis, 
have given it a tick of being in accord with what (they happen to think, 
by majority vote) are people’s timeless, transcendent fundamental rights. 
I am delighted to say that at the final stages of preparing this paper, a 
private member’s bill in Canada to rid it of section 13 was passed 
through the House of Commons and now only awaits passage through 
the unelected Senate — which is close to a certainty in my view — 
before it will be repealed. And that repeal will have been accomplished 
the way it should be in my view, by the elected legislature not by the 
unelected judges. 
I am also aware that the Whatcott case18 has been argued at the 
Supreme Court, with the decision due in the not too distant future. 
Whatcott involves a constitutional challenge to Saskatchewan’s section 
14(1)(b) Saskatchewan Human Rights Code19 hate speech law, on the 
basis that it infringes the Charter’s section 2 freedom of expression 
and/or freedom of religion guarantees. And I realize that a decision in 
Whatcott to invalidate Saskatchewan’s hate speech law may conceivably 
even involve the justices saying that Taylor is now bad law. 
But you should realize that this is at core a philosophical, political 
and moral dispute grounded in competing versions of why free speech 
and a free press matter, that unelected top judges have absolutely no extra 
expertise in such matters, that the political, democratic system could 
deliver either the pro- or anti-section 13 outcomes, and that if anything 
the Charter, once a precedent like Taylor is in place, makes repeal 
considerably more difficult. It has a tendency to lock in legislation. 
Let me try to support those claims by turning to Australia. As it hap-
pens, there is a fairly close analogy there to the Mark Steyn saga. A 
                                                                                                             
17 See, for example, Adam Tomkins, “In Defence of the Political Constitution” (2002) 22 
Oxford J. Legal Stud. 170. 
18 Saskatchewan (Human Rights Commission) v. Whatcott, appeal heard and reserved October 
12, 2011, [2010] S.C.C.A. No. 155 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Whatcott”]. 
19 S.S. 1979, c. S-24.1. 
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newspaper columnist, Andrew Bolt, was taken to court under the 1995 
amendment to the Racial Discrimination Act20 that created section 18C.21 
This section, in an Orwellian way, makes some conduct unlawful, but not 
a criminal offence. It does so if your speech or act “is reasonably likely 
... to offend, insult, humiliate or intimidate” others, and done because of 
their race (among other things). There is then section 18D, which gives 
exemptions if what you said was done reasonably and in good faith, 
including as part of a fair comment on a matter of public interest. 
Basically this is an Australian national statutory provision that im-
poses non-penal hate speech restrictions. After a trial at first instance Mr. 
Bolt and the Herald Sun newspaper lost. (The opinions voiced here 
related not to demographics and Islam but rather to affirmative action 
benefits flowing to self-identifying Aboriginals who appeared, geneti-
cally, to have little Aboriginal blood.) 
The Australian statutory provision looks less broad than Canada’s 
hate speech provisions, and seemingly has stronger built-in speech 
protecting defences. But the first instance Australian judge did not 
interpret the statute that way. For instance, the judge interpreted the 
section 18C “reasonably likely to offend” test to be one that is assessed 
by reference to some objective member of those claiming victimhood — 
not by reference to a reasonable member of the community at large — as 
well as holding that the onus of proof for triggering the section 18D 
exemption lay on Bolt, while reading in a “what is deemed to be gratui-
tously offensive can’t claim the exemption” rider. Moreover, as no 
monetary penalties applied — the remedy was simply a judge-dictated 
pseudo-apology having to be run by the paper — the newspaper insurers 
refused to appeal, though my publicly stated newspaper column opinion 
at the time was that Bolt would have won an appeal. 
In Australia too you can see that the real speech inhibitor is the chill-
ing effect of the threat of expensive litigation where complainants have 
their costs covered and the newspaper and writer do not. 
My comparative point is that press freedom is no less protected in 
Australia. If, like me, you dislike hate speech laws, you gain some 
comfort from the fact the Australian Opposition party has pledged in 
unequivocal terms to repeal at least most of these provisions while 
simultaneously to buttress the section 18D defences, and has done so 
                                                                                                             
20 Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). 
21 See Eatock v. Bolt, [2011] FCA 1103 (F.C.A.). 
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more directly and overtly than Mr. Harper’s Tories did, and without 
hoping for any cover from the courts. 
And if you noticed that Mr. Bolt lost in Australia while the Human 
Rights Commission actions against Mr. Steyn were all ultimately 
dismissed (in Ontario on the basis of that Commission having no 
jurisdiction), you need also to consider that in Australia the Bolt case 
is virtually the only civil hate speech action there has been while in 
Canada there have been many, with many accused (if we can use that 
word) losing — including the stand-up comedian Guy Earle in British 
Columbia. 
And in more general terms you should likewise bear in mind the 
need to avoid falling victim to the fallacy of the frozen legislature 
assumption, the vague notion that when it comes to rights and respecting 
rights, the output of the elected legislature in Canada was somehow 
frozen as of 1982, and so had there never been the Charter no advances 
on the rights front would ever have emanated from a bill of rights-
lacking legislature these past 30 years — a nonsense when you specifi-
cally articulate the point but a not unheard of implicit assumption from 
Charter defenders. 
I repeat, then, that from any perspective — either in favour of section 
13 type hate speech laws or against them — a comparison with Australia 
does not indicate that the Charter has improved freedom of the press. If 
you see this issue in terms of having to make a debatable, contestable 
social policy line-drawing call, and one where a committee of ex-lawyers 
has not a scintilla of extra moral, political or philosophical expertise, 
then that is hardly surprising. 
What about defamation laws though, an area of law with obvious 
implications for freedom of the press? Let me start this time with 
Australia, which sits somewhere between the U.S. and the U.K. in 
striking the balance between the competing social goods or goals of 
protecting people’s reputations from attacks by others (on the one hand) 
and the desire to leave people with lots of scope to pass comment on 
others’ conduct and character (on the other). Obviously any balance 
struck needs to give some weight to protecting people’s characters from 
at least knowingly and maliciously false and outrageous slanders. 
Likewise, any balance needs to concern itself with the bad consequences 
that might flow if speakers need dead certainty and rock-solid proof 
before making claims, of the dangers of stifling not just false allegations 
but also true ones. 
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Put differently, there is a world of difference between something 
being true and one’s being able to prove it is true in a court of law where 
the onus of proof is on you (the defamation defendant) to prove it. 
We are talking, again, about where to draw highly debatable, con-
testable social policy lines seeking to balance two social goods that are in 
conflict. The Americans go further than anywhere else in favouring the 
wide-open speech side of the ledger, especially when the allegations are 
against public figures — though even there a knowingly false and 
malicious allegation will lead to a successful defamation action (if you 
prove as much). Meanwhile the traditional British balance gives consid-
erably more weight to protecting people’s reputations, to the point that its 
courts have on occasion been characterized in terms of their receptivity 
to “libel tourism”. 
I am revealing no secrets when I point out that in purely legal terms 
the U.S. balance gives the press more scope than anywhere else to write 
things about people without fear of a lawsuit, even things that on 
occasion may prove to be unwarranted or false. Of course if we cast our 
gaze up from the purely legal and consider as well cultural factors such 
as the ethos of the press (and I think now of the British tabloid press) and 
its willingness to pay significant defamation damages to the odd litigant 
in order to achieve million-plus sales, then matters are not nearly so clear 
as to whether the press in the U.S. or the U.K. is more apt “to speak truth 
to power” (and to puffed up, holier-than-thou celebrities). 
But my point, again, is that a comparison of Canada to Australia vis-
à-vis the defamation law regime in each jurisdiction gives us no grounds 
for thinking the Charter does anything at all to promote a more rights-
respecting outcome. 
First, and to repeat myself, it is a highly contestable and everywhere 
debated issue as to which drawn line is most rights-respecting or best or 
least bad in this exercise of balancing reputation against scope to publish 
what sometimes may be false claims. 
Second, if we simply assume that the U.S. end of the spectrum, the 
more scope for speech end, is preferable, then Australia does at least as 
well as Canada — possibly better. 
For those who would like a brief, up-to-date account of the law of 
defamation in Australia, the one provided by Justice Peter Applegarth, a 
judge of the Supreme Court of Queensland, is the place to look.22 Let me 
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here give away the punch line and tell you that in the 1997 case of Lange 
v. Australian Broadcasting Corp.23 the High Court of Australia created a 
special category of common law qualified privilege for communications 
about government and political matters — meaning a defence for 
speakers and publishers even where truth cannot ultimately be proven in 
court (though some states in Australia already had a statutory defence of 
qualified privilege that covered this). Basically, a publisher has to act 
reasonably in the circumstances and without malice to trigger this 
privilege or defence related to governmental or political matters. And 
“reasonable in the circumstances” means the publisher has “reasonable 
grounds for believing that the imputation was true, took proper steps, so 
far as they were reasonably open, to verify the accuracy of the material 
and did not believe the imputation was untrue”.24 And this is in addition 
to the traditional defence of qualified privilege that does not require 
reasonableness, and in some circumstances gives wider protection25 (for 
example, as regards matters of public interest outside government and 
political matters). 
This Lange defence superseded a “constitutionalized” defamation 
defence and is related to what in Australia is known as the implied right 
to freedom of political communication,26 albeit in a complicated and 
contentious way. Luckily for our purposes we can leave the position in 
Australia at that. 
Meanwhile the state of Canada’s Charter-driven defamation law re-
gime is more or less this. The more traditional British-style balance, 
giving a good deal more weight to protecting reputation than does U.S. 
defamation law, was moved or altered in Grant v. Torstar Corp.27 along 
the spectrum a bit towards the U.S. position (though still falling a good 
deal short of where the U.S. line is drawn). The Supreme Court of 
Canada opted for a new rule “that gives greater scope to freedom of 
expression while offering adequate protection of reputation ... [this new 
defence requiring publishers to] establish that they acted responsibly in 
attempting to verify the information [published related to] a matter of 
public interest”.28 Call this the “defence of responsible communication”, 
requiring judges to think the topic is a matter of public interest and that 
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24 Id., at 574. 
25 See Roberts v. Bass (2002), 212 C.L.R. 1 (H.C.A.). 
26 See Applegarth, supra, note 22. 
27 [2009] S.C.J. No. 61, [2009] 3 S.C.R. 640 (S.C.C.). 
28 Id., at paras. 66, 85. 
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the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations (given the 
circumstances), and you can see that this new defence will sometimes 
offer protection when published claims ultimately prove to be untrue — 
or what is not quite the same, when the publisher is unable to prove their 
truth in court. Something similar applies to wholly private law cases not 
directly governed by the Charter, because we are told in WIC Radio Ltd. 
v. Simpson29 that the common law (i.e., purely judge-made law) is to be 
guided by Charter values. 
Meantime, in a case that is no doubt of interest to journalists, the Su-
preme Court held in 2010 that there is no basis for recognizing a class-
based constitutional or quasi-constitutional journalist-source privilege 
under either the Canadian Charter or the Quebec Charter.30 
So that gives you a bit of detail as regards the state of the defamation 
law regimes in Canada and Australia. But my larger point is that both 
countries’ regimes fall easily within what the vast preponderance of 
people would consider some rights-respecting core. And for pro-as-
much-scope-to-speak-as-possible people like me, neither country 
matches the U.S. but Australia does at least as well as Canada, possibly 
better. Put more bluntly, bill of rights-lacking Australia does every bit as 
well as Charter-dominated Canada in terms of defamation law in giving 
people lots of scope to speak their minds. 
Precisely the same goes for hate speech laws in both countries as 
they relate to freedom of the press, as we have seen. 
My conclusion then, one that will be surprising to some I suspect, is 
that Canada’s entrenched Charter adds nothing to freedom of the press if 
Canada is being compared to its closest constitutional cousin Australia, 
and so tangentially to what it might have looked like today without the 
Charter. 
Of course that conclusion rests on my preference for an extensive, 
hardly-limited-at-all protection of free speech entitlements, and nothing 
about that preference is self-evidently best or correct. It will vary for 
each of us. More tellingly, perhaps, the same person’s preference for an 
expansive, hardly-limited-at-all protection for this right will not always 
translate to that right or to all rights, or to all Charter-enumerated rights. 
For each of us, where we draw the line will vary from right to right. The 
same goes for the top judges. The same goes for the elected legislators. 
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That means that those readers who think the free speech right works 
particularly well for my argument here, because the judges have allowed 
more inroads or limitations on it than they might have, or than they have 
as regards some other favoured right, still would have to show that all 
rights ought always to be given the hardly-limited-at-all treatment. (And 
few think this and anyway that case, in my view, is nearly impossible to 
make in any persuasive way.) Or they would have to show that where the 
Canadian judges happened to have drawn these contestable lines across 
the whole range of enumerated rights is better than where elected 
legislatures would have drawn them, and better by a big enough margin 
to outweigh the democratic illegitimacy attaching to a “judges have the 
last word” procedure. (Another tough argument in my view.) 
The undeniable truth is that smart, well-informed, reasonable people 
disagree about all those social policy line-drawing calls articulated in the 
language of rights. It is as simple as that. What differs between Australia 
and Canada is whether it is the top judges or the elected legislature that 
has, for all practical purposes, the final word on these issues. 
 
 
